Human Rights Final

“Human rights Between theory and Practice”

Paper Presented By
Abdelhamied El-Rafie
MAIR student at :
Alliant International University
Mexico city Campus
For the Course:
Contemporary Issues in Perspective
Under the Supervision of :
Professor Dr. Camilo Perez Bustillo


Introduction :

My paper is titled “Human rights Between theory and Practice”

My questions will be :
1. what is the Theoretical Background of Human rights?
2. What is the International organizational system for Human rights?
3. Is Human rights politicized?

My Hypothesis is that “ Regardless the Human Rights theories and acts and Laws It will
be Politicized in Practice with regards to the International System and its balance of
Powers”

Part I The Historical and theoretical Background
The article Human rights :Chimera on sheep’s clothing? (1) Helped me a lot in this part
and I have quoted several Parts from it

“The Historical Origins of Human Rights

Human rights are a product of a philosophical debate that has raged for over two
thousand years within the European societies and their colonial descendants. This
argument has focused on a search for moral standards of political organization and
behaviour that is independent of the contemporary society. In other words, many people
have been unsatisfied with the notion that what is right or good is simply what a
particular society or ruling elite feels is right or good at any given time. This unease has
led to a quest for enduring moral imperatives that bind societies and their rulers over time
and from place to place. Fierce debates raged among political philosophers as these issue
were argued through. While a path was paved by successive thinkers that lead to
contemporary human rights, a second lane was laid down at the same time by those who
resisted this direction. The emergence of human rights from the natural rights tradition
did not come without opposition, as some argued that rights could only from the law of a
particular society and could not come from any natural or inherent source. The essence of
this debate continues today from seeds sown by previous generations of philosophers.

The earliest direct precursor to human rights might be found in the notions of `natural
right' developed by classical Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, but this concept was
more fully developed by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. For several
centuries Aquinas' conception held sway: there were goods or behaviours that were
naturally right (or wrong) because God ordained it so. What was naturally right could be
ascertained by humans by `right reason' - thinking properly. Hugo Grotius further
expanded on this notion in De jure belli et paci, where he propounded the immutability of
what is naturally right and wrong”(1)


“Now the Law of Nature is so unalterable, that it cannot be changed even by God
himself. For although the power of God is infinite, yet there are some things, to which it
does not extend. ...Thus two and two must make four, nor is it possible otherwise; nor,
again, can what is really evil not be evil.

The moral authority of natural right was assured because it had divine authorship. In
effect, God decided what limits should be placed on the human political activity. But the
long-term difficulty for this train of political thought lay precisely in its religious
foundations.

As the reformation caught on and ecclesiastical authority was shaken and challenged by
rationalism, political philosophers argued for new bases of natural right. Thomas Hobbes
posed the first major assault in 1651 on the divine basis of natural right by describing a
State of Nature in which God did not seem to play any role. Perhaps more importantly,
however, Hobbes also made a crucial leap from `natural right' to `a natural right'. In other
words, there was no longer just a list of behaviour that was naturally right or wrong;
Hobbes added that there could be some claim or entitlement which was derived from
nature. In Hobbes' view, this natural right was one of self-preservation.

Further reinforcement of natural rights came with Immanuel Kant's writings later in the
17th century that reacted to Hobbes' work. In his view, the congregation of humans into a
state-structured society resulted from a rational need for protection from each other's
violence that would be found in a state of nature. However, the fundamental requirements
of morality required that each treat another according to universal principles. Kant's
political doctrine was derived from his moral philosophy, and as such he argued that a
state had to be organized through the imposition of, and obedience to, laws that applied
universally; nevertheless, these laws should respect the equality, freedom, and autonomy
of the citizens. In this way Kant, prescribed that basic rights were necessary for civil
society:

A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first paying tribute to
morality. ...The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling
power must make.

However, the divine basis of natural right was still pursued for more than a century after
Hobbes published his Leviathan. John Locke wrote a strong defence of natural rights in
the late 17th century with the publication of his Two Treatises on Government, but his
arguments were filled with references to what God had ordained or given to mankind.
Locke had a lasting influence on political discourse that was reflected in both the
American Declaration of Independence and France's Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen, passed by the Republican Assembly after the revolution in 1789. The


French declaration proclaimed 17 rights as "the natural, inalienable and sacred rights of
man".

The French Declaration of Rights immediately galvanized political writers in England
and provoked two scathing attacks on its notion of natural rights. Jeremy Bentham's
clause-by-clause critique of the Declaration, entitled Anarchical Fallacies, argued
vehemently that there can be no natural rights, since rights are created by the law of a
society:

Right, the substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but from
laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoriticians, and dealers in moral and
intellectual poisons come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters, `gorgons and
chimeras dire'.

Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,
- nonsense upon stilts.

Edmund Burke also wrote a stinging attack on the French Declaration's assertion of
natural rights, in which he argued that rights were those benefits won within each society.
(5)
The rights held by the English and French were different, since they were the product of
different political struggles through history.

Soon after the attacks on the French Declaration, Thomas Paine wrote a defence of the
conception of natural rights and their connection to the rights of a particular society. In
The Rights of Man, published in two parts in 1791 and 1792, Paine made a distinction
between natural rights and civil rights, but he continued to see a necessary connection:

Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are
all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an
individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights
of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of being a member of
society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases,
sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.

This passage reflects another, earlier inspiration for human rights from the social contract
views of writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued that people agree to live in
common if society protects them. Indeed, the purpose of the state is to protect those rights
that individuals cannot defend on their own. Rousseau had set the ground for Paine
decades earlier with his Social Contract, in which he not only lambasted attempts to tie
religion to the foundations of political order but disentangled the rights of a society from
natural rights. In Rousseau's view, the rights in a civil society are hallowed: "But the


social order is a scared right which serves as a basis for other rights. And as it is not a
natural right, it must be one founded on covenants." Rousseau then eleaborated a number
of rights of citizens and limits on the sovereign's power.

The debate in the late eighteenth century has left telling traces. Controversy continues to
swirl over the question whether rights are creations of particular societies or independent
of them.

Modern theorists have developed a notion of natural rights that does not draw its source
or inspiration from a divine ordering. The ground work for this secular natural rights
trend was laid by Paine and even Rousseau. In its place has arisen a variety of theories
that are humanist and rationalist; the `natural' element is determined from the
prerequisites of human society which are said to be rationally ascertainable. Thus there
are constant criteria which can be identified for peaceful governance and the development
of human society. But problems can develop for this school of thought when notions of a
social contract are said to underlie the society from which rights are deduced.

Contemporary notions of human rights draw very deeply from this natural rights
tradition. In a further extension of the natural rights tradition, human rights are now often
viewed as arising essentially from the nature of humankind itself. The idea that all
humans possess human rights simply by existing and that these rights cannot be taken
away from them are direct descendants of natural rights.

However, a persistent opposition to this view builds on the criticisms of Burke and
Bentham, and even from the contractarian views of Rousseau's image of civil society. In
this perspective rights do not exist independently of human endeavour; they can only be
created by human action. Rights are viewed as the product a particular society and its
legal system.

In this vein, Karl Marx also left a legacy of opposition to rights that hindered socialist
thinkers from accommodating rights within their theories of society. Marx denounced
rights as a fabrication of bourgeois society, in which the individual was divorced from his
or her society; rights were needed in capitalist states in order to provide protection from
the state. In the marxist view of society, an individual is essentially a product of society
and, ideally, should not be seen in an antagonistic relationship where rights are needed.
However, many socialists have come to accept certain conceptions of rights in the late
twentieth century.

Thus, the history of political philosophy has been one of several centuries of debate. The
child of natural rights philosophers, human rights, has come to hold a powerful place in
contemporary political consciousness. However, neither preponderant belief in, nor even
a consensus of support for human rights do not answer the concerns raised by the earlier
thinkers - are rights truly the product of a particular vision and laws of a society? Or, are
human rights so inherent in humanness that their origins and foundations are
incontestable?


A further difficulty, with profound implications, that human rights theories have to
overcome is their emergence from these Western political traditions. Not only are they a
product of European natural rights, but the particular rights that are viewed as `natural'
have been profoundly shaped by the liberalism that emerged in the 19th and 20th
centuries. With human rights, the rhetorical framework of the natural rights tradition has
come to serve as a vehicle for the values of Western liberalism.

An easy and powerful criticism is that human rights cannot be universal. In their basic
concept they are a Western creation, based on the European tradition that individuals are
separable from their society. But one may question whether these rights can apply to
collectivist or communitarian societies that view the individual as an indivisible element
of the whole society. Westerners, and many others, have come to place a high value on
each individual human, but this is not a value judgment that is universal. There is
substantive disagreement on the extent of, or even the need for, any protection of
individuals against their society.

In addition to this problem with the concept itself, there are strong objections to the

manner in which human rights have been conceptualized. Many lists of human rights read
like specifications for liberal democracy. A variety of traditional societies can be found in
the world that operate harmoniously, but are not based on equality let alone universal
suffrage.

A question that will recur in later discussions is whether the `human rights' advocated
today are really civil rights that pertain to a particular - liberal - conception of society. To
a large extent, the resolution of this issue depends upon the ultimate goal of human rights.
If human rights are really surrogate liberalism, then it will be next to impossible to argue
their inherent authority over competing political values. In order for human rights to
enjoy universal legitimacy they must have a basis that survives charges of ideological
imperialism. Human rights must have a universally acceptable basis in order for there to
be any substantial measure of compliance. (1)

“The Motivation for Human Rights

Some understanding about the nature of human rights can be gleaned from the various
reasons that can be advanced for holding them. A prime concern is to offer protection
from tyrannical and authoritarian calculations. Capricious or repressive measures of an
autocratic government may be constrained with the recognition of supreme moral limits
on any government's freedom of action. But even among governments that are genuinely
limited by moral considerations, there may still be a need to shield the populace from
utilitarian decision-making. The greater good of the whole society may lead to sacrifice
or exploitation of minority interests. Or, the provision of important benefits within the
society may be limited by calculations that public resources should be spent on other
enterprises.


The attraction of human rights is that they are often thought to exist beyond the
determination of specific societies. Thus, they set a universal standard that can be used to
judge any society. Human rights provide an acceptable bench mark with which
individuals or governments from one part of the world may criticize the norms followed
by other governments or cultures. With an acceptance of human rights, Moslems, Hindus,
Christians, capitalists, socialists, democracies, or tribal oligarchies may all legitimately
censure each other. This criticism across religious, political, and economic divides gains
its legitimacy because human rights are said to enshrine universal moral standards.
Without fully universal human rights, one is left simply trying to assert that one's own
way of thinking is better than somebody else's.

The prime rhetorical benefit of human rights is that they are viewed as being so basic and
so fundamental to human existence that they should trump any other consideration. Just
as Dworkin has argued that any conception of `rights' trumps other claims within a
society, human rights may be of a higher order that supersedes even other rights claims
within a society.

Other motivations for human rights may stem from a fear of the consequences of denying
their existence. Because of the currency given human rights in contemporary political
debate, there is a danger that such a denial will provide support for brutal regimes who
defend their repression on the grounds that international human rights norms are simply a
fanciful creation that has no universal authority. The United Nations conference on
human rights held in Vienna in 1993 saw some of the world's most repressive
governments making precisely this argument, and few people would wish to provide
further justification for this position. In addition, a great deal of political advocacy relies
on human rights rhetoric to provide a legitimating moral force. Without the appeal to
human rights, democratic champions would have to argue the desirability of values such
as equality and freedom of speech across the often incomparable circumstances of the
world's societies, rather than asserting that such benefits just inherently flow from human
existence.

“ The Theoretical Foundation of Human Rights

Several competing bases have been asserted for universal human rights. It is essential to
understand these various foundations, since they can result in quite different
understandings of the specific benefits protected by human rights. As well, each approach
to human rights has different strengths and vulnerabilities in facing the challenges posed
by relativism and utilitarianism.

Many have argued that human rights exist in order to protect the basic dignity of human
life. Indeed, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights embodies this goal by
declaring that human rights flow from "the inherent dignity of the human person". Strong
arguments have been made, especially by western liberals, that human rights must be
directed to protecting and promoting human dignity. As Jack Donnelly has written, "We


have human rights not to the requisites for health but to those things `needed' for a life of
dignity, for a life worthy of a human being, a life that cannot be enjoyed without these
rights" (original emphasis). This view is perhaps the most pervasively held, especially
among human rights activists; the rhetoric of human-rights disputes most frequently
invokes this notion of striving for the dignity that makes human life worth living. The
idea of promoting human dignity has considerable appeal, since human life is given a
distinctive weight over other animals in most societies precisely because we are capable
of cultivating the quality of our lives.

Unfortunately, the promotion of dignity may well provide an unstable foundation for the
construction of universal moral standards. The inherent weakness of this approach lies in
trying to identify the nature of this dignity. Donnelly unwittingly reveals this shortcoming
in expanding upon the deliberate human action that creates human rights. "Human rights
represent a social choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality, which rests
on a particular substantive account of the minimum requirements of a life of dignity".

Dignity is a very elastic concept and the substance given to it is very much a moral
choice, and a particular conception of dignity becomes paramount. But, who makes this
choice and why should one conception prevail over other views of dignity? Even general
rejection of outlandish assertions of dignity may not indicate agreement on a core
substance. There might be widespread derision of my assertion that I can only lead a truly
dignified life if I am surrounded by 100 doting love-slaves. But a disapproval of the lack
of equality in my vision of dignity does not necessarily demonstrate that equality is a
universal component of dignity. While one of the most basic liberal beliefs about human
dignity is that all humans are equal, social division and hierarchy play important roles in
aspects of Hindu, Confucian, Muslim, and Roman Catholic views of human life. Indeed,
`dignity' is often achieved in these views by striving to fulfill one's particular vocation
within an ordered set of roles. But, if human rights are meant to be universal standards,
the inherent dignity that is supposed to be protected should be a common vision. Without
sufficient commonality, dignity cannot suffice as the ultimate goal of human rights.

An alternative basis for human rights draws from the requisites for human well-being.
One advocate of this approach, Allan Gewirth, would agree with Donnelly that human
rights are drawn in essence from humankind's moral nature, but Gewirth does not follow
Donnelly's conclusion that human rights are a moral vision of human dignity. Rather,
Gewirth argues that "agency or action is the common subject of all morality and
practice". (14) Human rights are not just a product of morality but protect the basic
freedom and well-being necessary for human agency. Gewirth distinguished between
three types of rights that address different levels of well-being. Basic rights safeguard
one's subsistence or basic well-being. Nonsubtractive rights maintain the capacity for
fulfilling purposive agency, while additive rights provide the requisites for developing
one's capabilities - such as education. Gewirth differentiates between these rights because
he accepts that humans vary tremendously in their capacity for purposive agency.
Through what he calls the principle of proportionality, humans are entitled to those rights
that are proportionate to their capacity for agency. Thus, individuals who are comatose


only have basic rights to subsistence, since they are incapable of any purposive action. “
(1)

Part II The International System’s Understanding of the Issue of Human
Rights

Let me quote some articles from the Resolution of the GA to Establish the Human Rights
Council

“Reaffirming the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations, including developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and achieving
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
Reaffirming also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 and the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action,2 and recalling the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,3 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights3 and other human rights instruments,
Reaffirming further that all human rights are universal, indivisible,
interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and that all human rights must
be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same
emphasis,
Reaffirming that, while the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Emphasizing the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter,
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any
kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights are the
pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and
well-being, and recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, non-selectivity in the consideration of human
rights issues, and the elimination of
double standards and politicization,
Recognizing further that the promotion and protection of human rights should
be based on the principles of cooperation and genuine dialogue and aimed at
strengthening the capacity of Member States to comply with their human rights
obligations for the benefit of all human beings,
Acknowledging that non-governmental organizations play an important role at
the national, regional and international levels, in the promotion and protection of
human rights,


Reaffirming the commitment to strengthen the United Nations human rights
machinery, with the aim of ensuring effective enjoyment by all of all human rights,
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to
development, and to that end, the resolve to create a Human Rights Council,
1. Decides to establish the Human Rights Council, based in Geneva, in
replacement of the Commission on Human Rights, as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly; the Assembly shall review the status of the Council within five
years;
2. Decides that the Council shall be responsible for promoting universal
respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner;
3. Decides also that the Council should address situations of violations of
human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make
recommendations thereon. It should also promote the effective coordination and the
mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system;
4. Decides further that the work of the Council shall be guided by the
principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive
international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the promotion and
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development;
5. Decides that the Council shall, inter alia:
(a) Promote human rights education and learning as well as advisory
services, technical assistance and capacity-building, to be provided in consultation
with and with the consent of Member States concerned;
(b) Serve as a forum for dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights;
(c) Make recommendations to the General Assembly for the further
development of international law in the field of human rights;
(d) Promote the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken
by States and follow-up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and
protection of human rights emanating from United Nations conferences and
summits;
(e) Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable
information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal
treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism,
based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned
and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; such a mechanism shall
complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies; the Council shall develop
the modalities and necessary time allocation for the universal periodic review
mechanism within one year after the holding of its first session;
(f) Contribute, through dialogue and cooperation, towards the prevention of
human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies;
(g) Assume the role and responsibilities of the Commission on Human
Rights relating to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, as decided by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/141 of
20 December 1993;


(h) Work in close cooperation in the field of human rights with
Governments, regional organizations, national human rights institutions and civil
society;
(i) Make recommendations with regard to the promotion and protection of
human rights;
(j) Submit an annual report to the General Assembly;
6. Decides also that the Council shall assume, review and, where necessary,
improve and rationalize all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of
the Commission on Human Rights in order to maintain a system of special
procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure; the Council shall complete
this review within one year after the holding of its first session;
7. Decides further that the Council shall consist of forty-seven Member
States, which shall be elected directly and individually by secret ballot by the
majority of the members of the General Assembly; the membership shall be based
on equitable geographical distribution, and seats shall be distributed as follows
among regional groups: Group of African States, thirteen; Group of Asian States,
thirteen; Group of Eastern European States, six; Group of Latin American and
Caribbean States, eight; and Group of Western European and other States, seven; the
members of the Council shall serve for a period of three years and shall not be
eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms;
8. Decides that the membership in the Council shall be open to all States
Members of the United Nations; when electing members of the Council, Member
States shall take into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and
protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made
thereto; the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and
voting, may suspend the rights of membership in the Council of a member of the
Council that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights;”(2)

Now let me quote from the United Nations Fund for Population The Human Rights based
Approach

”The Human Rights-Based Approach

The Cairo Consensus forged at the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) is underpinned by human rights principles. The ICPD and ICPD +5
placed population, reproductive health and gender equality in a human rights-based
framework linked to human development and sustained economic growth. UNFPA is
committed to integrating human rights standards and principles into its work at the
country level.

The UN Secretary-General’s Programme for Reform (1997), and its second phase, An
Agenda for Further Change (2001), called upon UN Agencies to make human rights a
cross-cutting priority for the UN system. In 2003, a group of UN agencies, including
UNFPA, committed to integrating human rights into their national development


cooperation programmes by adopting the Common Understanding on a rights-based
approach.

Before 1997, most UN development agencies pursued a ‘basic needs’ approach: They
identified basic requirements of beneficiaries and either supported initiatives to improve
service delivery or advocated for their fulfilment.

UNFPA and its UN partners now work to fulfil the rights of people, rather than the needs
of beneficiaries. There is a critical distinction: A need not fulfilled leads to
dissatisfaction. In contrast, a right that is not respected leads to a violation, and its redress
or reparation can be legally and legitimately claimed. A human rights-based approach to
programming differs from the basic needs approach in that it recognizes the existence of
rights. It also reinforces capacities of duty bearers (usually governments) to respect,
protect and guarantee these rights.

In a rights-based approach, every human being is recognized both as a person and as a
right-holder. A rights-based approach strives to secure the freedom, well-being and
dignity of all people everywhere, within the framework of essential standards and
principles, duties and obligations. The rights-based approach supports mechanisms to
ensure that entitlements are attained and safeguarded.

Governments have three levels of obligation: to respect, protect and fulfil every right.

• To respect a right means refraining from interfering with the enjoyment of the
right.
• To protect the right means enacting laws that create mechanisms to prevent
violation of the right by state authorities or by non-state actors. This protection is
to be granted equally to all.


• To fulfil the right means to take active steps to put in place institutions and
procedures, including the allocation of resources to enable people to enjoy the
right. A rights-based approach develops the capacity of duty-bearers to meet their
obligations and encourages rights holders to claim their rights.

Rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The human rights-based approach
focuses on those who are most vulnerable, excluded or discriminated against. UNFPA is
committed to work for the poorest women, men and youth, particularly in the fields of
sustainable development and population, reproductive health and rights and HIV
prevention, in times of peace or in times of conflict, as well as in response to natural
disasters. This often requires an analysis of gender and social exclusion to ensure that
programmes reach the most marginalized and vulnerable segments of the population.

The human rights-based approach constitutes a framework of action as well as a
methodological tool to fulfil UNFPA’s mandate in the context of reforms in a changing
world. This approach is also expected to achieve results: sustained progress towards
respect of human rights, development, peace, security, eradication of poverty, and
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Three strategies are key to applying human rights standards to reproductive health

• Creating an enabling policy environment that promotes reproductive
health and rights, including building capacity to strengthen health
systems, partnering with civil society and community-based
organizations, and monitoring budgetary appropriations to ensure that
reproductive health care is covered.
• Widening access to comprehensive reproductive health services, with an
emphasis on disadvantaged groups.
• Building awareness of the reproductive rights of women, men and
adolescents so that they can claim their rights to reproductive health.
• Encouraging, involving and building the capacity of individuals and
communities to participate in the design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of reproductive health programmes and services that affect
their lives.

In the area of population and development, applying human rights standards includes:

• Improving utilization of age- and sex-disaggregated data so that
governments, UN agencies, and NGOs can target interventions in favour
of the most disadvantaged people.
• Integrating population and development linkages into national,
subnational and sectoral policies, plans and strategies, especially to
ensure that the rights of poor, disadvantaged or otherwise marginalized
groups are protected.


• Ensuring that development and poverty reduction policies, plans and
strategies address critical emerging issues such as migration,
urbanization, ageing and HIV and AIDS.

Applying human rights standards to the issues of gender equality and women’s
empowerment requires fostering an environment that promotes and enforces gender
equality in laws, practices, policies and value systems.

A number of UN mechanisms help UNFPA advance its mandate within the human rights
framework. For instance, recommendations of treaty bodies – such as the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Special Rapporteurs and the Working groups of the
Commission on Human Rights are invaluable tools in this regard.”(3)

Now let me Quote from The same website the UNFPA approach in putting rights into
practice

“Putting Rights into Practice

Incorporating the human rights-based approach into programming requires a shift from
thinking in terms of satisfying needs to designing interventions based on fulfilling rights.

The human rights-based approach to programming addresses development complexities
and humanitarian assistance holistically. It takes into consideration the connections
between individuals and the systems of power or influence and endeavors to create
dynamics of accountability.

This is a two-way street: individuals and communities need to be fully informed about
their rights and to participate in decisions that affect them. Governments and other duty
bearers often need assistance to develop the capacity, the resources and the political will
to fulfil their commitments to human rights.

A Human Rights Framework Calls for Interventions and Strategies to:

• Promote justice for women on the basis of
equality between women and men (equity)
• Enable women and men to claim their rights
(empowerment)
• Ensure that women and men are involved in
the design and implementation of
development initiatives (participation)

Make services accountable to the women and men who use them (accountability)


UNFPA works from both directions. It advocates with policymakers and leaders in
support of human rights standards affirmed in national laws and international
instruments, and helps them to assume their duties of protecting these rights. It
encourages particular attention to the rights of the most vulnerable women, men and
youth.

UNFPA also fulfils its mission by empowering vulnerable individuals and communities
through various strategies, including sensitization and awareness campaigns, training and
life-skills projects. Stronger Voices is an example of a programme that works from both
directions simultaneously: It helps communities mobilize to demand high-quality
reproductive health services, and it also helps providers better understand how they can
fully address the needs and rights of their clients.

A wide range of actors and legal mechanisms form an interconnected network of support
for protecting human rights. This network includes public institutions, the private sector,
the media, multilateral and bilateral organizations, NGOs, communities, associations,
leaders and political parties. Civil society, international organizations and community and
religious leaders as well as the media play a critical role in educating individuals and
communities about the rights they are entitled to and helping them to exercise them.

Actors for Change: National Human Rights Institutions

National human rights institutions – including human rights commissions, ombudsman
offices, and specialized institutions that protect the rights of a particular vulnerable group
– are increasingly active in a wide range of human rights causes, and UNFPA has been
instrumental in supporting them.

Progress has been quite significant in this area in the Latin America and the Caribbean
region. UNFPA co-sponsored, with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights, a Seminar on the Promotion
and Protection of Reproductive Rights through the work of National Human Rights
Institutions for Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada (Costa Rica, 2002).

A workshop with similar objectives was also held with Ombudsman Offices of the
Caribbean (Jamaica 2003). The resolution that emerged from this meeting calls for
strengthening their monitoring capabilities. As a result, reproductive health and rights are
now being integrated within country level action plans and in monitoring and follow up.

The human rights-based approach is concerned not just with outcomes but also with the
process by which outcomes are achieved. It requires that all stakeholders be included. It
recognizes that people are actors in their own development, rather than passive recipients
of commodities and services. Informing, educating and empowering stakeholders is key.
Participation is central, as both a means and an end, not only to ensure ownership, but
also to guarantee continuity.


Part III Human Rights in Practice

Conclusions:

The theory of Human rights plus the International Declarations and Decisions taken by
countries and organizations about these rights are Perfectly well phrased if we add to the
legal framework the Inspections done by International NGOs concerned by Human rights
is another sector of monitoring the practice of these rights .If we add to this The
International framework presented in HRC and ICJ we would have Aperfect World for
practicing Human Rights .

But If we look at reality we will find lots of Human Rights violations all over the World
and it may get the attention of International Public Opinion But the real actors are States
and certain states if I want to be more accurate The HR weapon is used against certain
states who are against the wills of the super power and against its agenda Iam not here to
defend violations because violations in Gaza or In Sudan are the Same in the occupied
territories and are the same in the US itself so why the sanctions are put on some regimes
while other violations are neglected ?

Therefore I disagree with what Sen calls for less involvement of the role of States in
Human rights because they are the real actors who have the abilities and capabilities to
put these rights in Practice .

This has a direct relation with my Hypothesis because I think that these rights are deeply
politicized because the practice has a direct relation with International Relations and
agendas of these relations and since we are living in a unipolar system so the relation
between these rights as politics not as rights or law therefore these rights has a direct fast
dynamics with that System. Even beyond if that System as analysts predict transfers into
a multipolar system then the practice and inspection of those rights will be related to the
Poles of that System .

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Resources:

1. Human rights :Chimera on sheep’s clothing?, ©Andrew Heard, 1997
http://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/intro.html
2. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf
3. http://www.unfpa.org/rights/approaches.htm
4. http://www.unfpa.org/rights/practice.htm

Readings:

1. http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521865173
2. http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/?gclid=CJ---
pOTh58CFQS7sgodnAkFJw
3. http://www.unfpa.org/about/index.htm
4. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx


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