The recent financial crisis largely stemmed from a failure to understand the build-up of housing risk. Better information can dampen the boom-bust cycle and make corrections less damaging.

1. The AEI International Center on
Housing Risk and Housing Risk Indices
Briefing by
Edward Pinto and Stephen Oliner
December 16, 2013

2. The Center’s Goals, Products, and
Motivating Principle
• Goals: To equip investors, lenders, borrowers and
policymakers with the information they need to assess and
mitigate risk in housing and mortgage markets.
• Products: An unprecedented set of tools for measuring
housing-related risk. Transparent and objective measures.
• Motivation: The recent financial crisis largely stemmed
from a failure to understand the build-up of housing risk.
Better information can dampen the boom-bust cycle and
make corrections less damaging.

3. The Need for Information on Housing Risk
• Essential for financial market stability.
– In the US, residential mortgage debt totals $11 trillion – the
largest debt market after US Treasuries.
– Lack of meaningful and timely housing risk indices has reduced
investors’ ability to limit exposure to unsafe mortgages.
• Essential for household financial stability.
– Houses are highly leveraged purchases, so declines in home prices
can be very damaging.
– Since 2007, about 8 million American households have lost their
homes and 10 million no longer have any equity.

4. Lessons from 2007 Housing Collapse
• Mortgage loans are only as sound as the practices used to
underwrite and originate them.
• Market stability depends on the preponderance of loans
being low risk, defined as good performance under stress.
• Political pressures are likely to degrade sound lending
practices over time.
• Lack of robust risk measures limits the market’s ability to
impose discipline.
• Bottom line: Transparent and objective measures of
mortgage risk, home-price risk, and the capital adequacy
needed to evaluate and manage housing risk.

5. A Century of Lessons
• The deterioration of lending standards from the early 1990s
to 2007 has historical precedents.
• Earlier episodes: 1926-33, late 1950s and 1960s, and early
1980s.
• Mortgage default rates rose in every case, sometimes to
disastrous levels.
• Prudent lending practices (or at least less risky practices)
were then re-established and defaults declined.
• The pattern is clear: the abandonment of sound mortgage
underwriting standards leads to trouble.

6. Steps to Date Are Inadequate
• After the 2007 collapse, government policy initially
attempted to curb perceived risk factors. But, ultimately,
traditional, common-sense credit standards were not
adopted.
– The regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act ignore down
payments and credit standards, and impose illusory limits on
debt loads.
• The government has not provided tools to adequately
measure housing risk.
• Without such measures, housing market will remain
vulnerable to what caused the latest collapse: the gradual
abandonment of sound mortgage underwriting standards.

7. Home Prices Once Again Deviating from Rents
Gap of about 11% in 2013:Q3, which opened up in only 6 quarters. Gap of same
size in 2002:Q3 took twice as long to open up.
Index, 1983:Q1 = 100
400
350
400
350
FHFA house price index*
300
300
2002:Q3
250
250
BLS rent index
200
200
150
150
100
100
50
50
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
* All-transactions index until 1990:Q4, purchase-only index thereafter.
Source: AEI International Center on Housing Risk, www.HousingRisk.org, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Housing Finance Agency.

8. What Will the Center Do To Fill the Void?
• The Center’s signature products are new indices of mortgage
risk, collateral risk, and capital adequacy – the AEI/PintoOliner risk indices.
– Objective measures, produced in nearly real time.
– Freely available at the Center’s website (www.HousingRisk.org).
• The Center’s international members are working on new risk
indices for other countries.
• The Center will sponsor US and international conferences.
• The Center’s nearly two dozen members will conduct a
broad research agenda and provide commentary on issues
related to housing risk.

9. AEI/Pinto-Oliner Risk Indices
• National Mortgage Risk Index (NMRI)
– Classifies loans into low, medium, and high risk based on default
experience of 2007 vintage loans with similar characteristics.
– Covers all gov’t-guaranteed mortgages and 85% of total market.
– Limited to purchase loans now; refi loans to be added in 2014.
• 10-metro Composite Collateral Risk Index (CRI)
– Metro areas chosen to represent housing market in U.S. as a whole.
– Expected release dates: DC-area index, early 2014; other metro
areas, by mid-2014.
• Capital Adequacy Index (CAI)
– Assesses capital reserves at institutions with large mortgage
exposure.
– Under development. Expected release date: Spring 2014.

10. ICHR Members
• Nearly two dozen top domestic and international
economists, scholars, and practitioners with decades of
experience in housing finance and policy.
• Primary developers of the AEI/Pinto-Oliner Risk Indices:
– Edward J. Pinto, resident fellow at AEI and co-director of the IHRC.
– Stephen D. Oliner, resident scholar at AEI and co-director of the
IHRC.
– Morris Davis, academic director of the Graaskamp Center for Real
Estate at the University of Wisconsin and visiting scholar at AEI.
– Michael F. Molesky, an economist and leading expert on mortgage
default risk and insurance regulation.

11. Measuring Mortgage Safety
• Why measure mortgage safety under stressful conditions?
– Cars are safety rated for crashworthiness at 35 mph, not 5 mph.
– Homes in the paths of hurricanes are rated for safety based on 125
mph winds, not 30 mph.
– Similarly, mortgage loans should be risk-rated under the stress of a
substantial drop in home prices—not flat or rising prices.
• Lessons learned from loan performance under extreme
stress also can substantially reduce default rates and market
losses during periods of moderate stress as well.

12. NMRI for Home Purchase Loans
Tracks nearly all loans with a Federal guarantee (about 75% of all loans). All
indexes shown are high relative to prudent standards and have edged up lately.
Stressed default rate
24%
FHA/RHS accounts for 30% of all purchase loans and is
the main factor behind high level of composite index.
24%
FHA/RHS: +0.9, from 22.3% to 23.2%*
20%
20%
16%
16%
12%
12%
Composite: +0.3, from 10.6% to 10.9%*
Recent rise in composite index also reflects increase in
Fannie’s risk level and market share. Details below.
8%
8%
Fannie/Freddie: +0.7, from 4.9% to 5.6%*
4%
4%
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13
* Index changes measured from first month shown.
Source: AEI International Center on Housing Risk, www.HousingRisk.org. Separate index not available for VA guaranteed loans. RHS is Rural Housing Service.

13. Calibrating Mortgage Safety
• Benchmarks for October composite NMRI of 10.9%.
– 1990 vintage. Composite index ≈ 6%. A time when the
preponderance of loans were safe.
– 2006-07 vintages. Composite index ≈ 20%. A time of exceptionally
lax lending standards.
• Benchmarks for FHA and Fannie/Freddie.
– FHA: 1936-55 vintages ≈ 3% or less, compared to 23.2% now. The
earlier period was the Golden Age of prudent FHA lending.
– Fannie/Freddie: 1988-90 vintages ≈ 4%, compared to 5.6% now.

14. Purchase Loan Origination Shares, by Risk Level
Less than half of new purchase loans are low risk, and the share has edged lower
in recent months. Likely would lead to market difficulties in event of recession.
50%
50%
Low risk
45%
45%
40%
40%
Low risk defined as stressed default rate of less then 6%,
medium risk is 6% to 12%, and high risk is 12% or higher.
35%
35%
High risk
30%
30%
25%
25%
Medium risk
20%
20%
Aug-13
Source: AEI International Center on Housing Risk, www.HousingRisk.org.
Sep-13
Oct-13

15. GSE Low-Risk Origination Shares, Purchase Loans
Stable for Freddie Mac at 70-75%. Lower for Fannie Mae and declining. Dropping
as well for the two GSEs combined as Fannie has taken market share from Freddie.
78%
78%
76%
76%
Freddie Mac
74%
74%
72%
72%
70%
70%
Combined
68%
68%
66%
66%
Fannie Mae
64%
64%
Note: FHA/RHS low-risk share (not shown) is less than 1%.
62%
62%
60%
60%
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Source: AEI International Center on Housing Risk, www.HousingRisk.org.
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13

16. Fannie Mae Share of GSE Purchase Loan Volume
Has increased since Q2, coinciding with greater riskiness
of Fannie’s loan acquisitions.
74%
72%
70%
68%
66%
64%
62%
60%
58%
2012:Q4
2013:Q1
Source: AEI International Center on Housing Risk, www.HousingRisk.org.
2013:Q2
2013:Q3
2013:Oct

17. Future NMRI Releases
• The NMRI for November and December will be released at
10 AM on January 27, 2014.
• Subsequent releases are expected to be on the last Monday
of each month.