Jaa -endowment fundraising july 2010 (jpd1542)

Responding to the scars and
the scares of the recession?

Today’s discussion is about the
future of endowment fundraising:
Agenda

 What happened 10/08 to 3/09 and why?

 What is its impact on endowment fundraising?

 How do we make the case for endowment?

 This is an opportunity to think together about where we
go from here…

Bentz Whaley Flessner 1

The Decades of 1990 through 2008
were breathtaking!
1990 the Dow sat at 2,700.
On October 10, 2007 the Dow peaked at 14,000

This represents
an increase of
more than
five-fold.

There were
problems, like
the rupture of
the Tech
Bubble.

But optimism
abounded.

These were also times of unprecedented
growth in philanthropy! Giving TRIPLED!
2008 total adjusted from
5.7% loss to 1.5% gain.

$123 billion
$ in billions

$315 billion

Bentz Whaley Flessner Giving USA 2010 3

We often called this the ―golden age‖ of
philanthropy.

Enrollment  Collegiate enrollments grew 36%
20
13.1m in 1990 to 17.9m in 2008.
15

10  Collegiate budgets grew 276%
5 $143b in 1990 to $394b in 2008.
0
 The pressures are mounting:
F…

F…

F…
F…
F…
F…
F…

F…
F…
F…
F…

F…
F…
F…
F…

F…
F…
F…
F…

- Tuition is outpacing inflation.
Expenditures
$500
$400 - Discounting (especially unfunded) is
$300 rising at most private institutions.
$200
$100
$0
 But endowment growth was
phenomenal. Intergenerational
FY90
FY91
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08

equity was “no worry”…
Data from CAE – VSE Data Miner Reports


The elements of the endowment ―revolution…‖

Several elements collaborated to build the endowment case:
 The convertion from defined-benefit to defined-contribution retirement
accounts got ―everyone‖ into the stock market.
 The ―high tech‖ economy created enormous, sudden wealth and with it
extraordinary philanthropy.
 Planned giving technology, marketing, consulting, specialization—growth of
―vehicles‖ created demand.
 ―Comprehensive‖ campaigns created new emphasis and new outlets for
―leveraging‖ higher giving.
 Campaign reporting and ―size competition‖ created new approaches to
deferred counting.
 The national rankings games made endowment holdings an enrollment
market vector and called it to much wider attention.


By 2008 the endowment thing seemed like a
guarantee. Everything hinged on endowment.
 Statistics illustrating how much of endowment growth was due to new gifts
are a little uncertain .
 During this period average annual endowment giving quadrupled from $2 billion
per year to $8 billion per year.
 By 2008 endowments received 26¢ of every gift dollar to higher education.
 BUT, the real static in the system is accounting evolution.
Do we count deferred? How about revocable? What discount factor do we use? When is an
estate pledge a pledge? Etc.?.

Endowment Gifts
$9.00
$8.00 In Billions
$7.00
$6.00
$5.00 In Billions $
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00 Data from CAE – VSE Data Miner Reports
$1.00
$0.00
FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08

But, market growth was a much more important driver than giving.

1990–2008:
the decades of ―BIG‖ endowment...
Institution FY1990 Value FY2008 Increase The big endowments
Value
became enormous.
Harvard $4.6 Billion $36.5 Billion 790%
Their growth
Yale $2.6 Billion $22.8 Billion 870%
outpaced the general
Stanford $2.5 Billion $17.2 Billion 688% markets.
Princeton $2.5 Billion $16.3 Billion 652%
There was
University of $3.7 Billion $16.1 Billion 435%
Texas fundraising —billion-
MIT $1.4 Billion $10.1 Billion 721% dollar campaigns
proliferated…
University of $0.4 Billion $7.3 Billion 1,825%
Michigan
Columbia $1.4 Billion $7.3 Billion 521%
…but the real growth
from management,
Northwestern $0.9 Billion $7.2 Billion 800%
models, expertise,
University of Penn $0.8 Billion $6.2 Billion 775% was the real key.


The ―Endowment Model‖ trap was set …

Several elements conspired change the case:
 Portfolio models drove the idea of diversification to the level of
enormous complication.
(The growth of ―alternative investments‖ from 28% to 51% is indicative.)

 The competition to maximize return inflates the level of
acceptable risk.
(Calibrating new risk/return ratios becomes more and more esoteric.)

 Maximal return thinking can foster greater willingness to
accept illiquidity – especially if it seems ―calculated.‖
(―Intergenerational equity,‖ etc., helped to re-think the timelines.)

 Management complexity encouraged more reliance on
external managers, consultants, and different professional
skills from staff.
(Proximity to mission, engagement, ―ownership-distance‖ creates different relation to
risk/reward.)


During golden years asset allocations
changed…
 According to NACUBO the asset allocations changed radically during
the decade:
Type of Asset Equities Fixed Liquidity Alternative
Income and Cash Strategies

FY2003 Average Allocation 49% 21% 2% 28%
FY2009 Average Allocation 32% 13% 4% 51%

Percent of Change: -17% -8% +2% +23%

 Alternative Investments took the place of the traditional equity. Much of
the alternatives were not only illiquid but could not be liquidated.
 Liquidity and Fixed Income had declined.
 The only source of cash was to sell into huge losses the
traditional equities markets.
Data from Jeffrey Larson, Larson/Kelleher Capital , former Harvard Endowment Mgr., Principle of Sowood Capital


The Great Recession

 The deepest, most sudden, most comprehensive
financial crisis since the Great Depression struck.

 Caught us ALL seemingly unaware.


What really happened in 2008?

 The Dow plunged from 14,000 to 6,500 in a matter of months
(a 54% loss).
 Financial markets collapsed led by housing.
 The national presidential campaigns stopped (almost).
 The credit markets froze.
 Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and failed. AIG and other teetered
on the edge.
 GM and Chrysler teetered at bankruptcy.
 Global liquidity markets evaporated.


What happened in 2008 had its origins in the
1980s…
Deregulation had:
 Taken down the barriers to investment banks entering the demand deposit market.
 Acceptable leverage rates in demand deposit rose quickly from 1:6 to 1:33 and going higher.
 Storefront mortgage brokers, sub-prime mortgages, collateralization—mortgage makers no longer
retained any interest in the mortgages they made.
 Credit default swaps (insurance against losses) mitigated ―acceptable‖ risk formulas.
The real estate market suddenly locked up:
 The mortgage industry and real estate values were overheated.
 The derivatives market had taken over mortgages.
 Real estate values fell, construction faulted, home owners went underwater.
 Investment banks holding securitize mortgages went into a tail-spin.
 They and others holding credit default swaps got pulled into the vacuum.
The financial markets ALL collapsed:
 Credit default swaps turned on themselves (the insurance against large losses began to cause large
losses—see AIG, Lehman Brothers, etc.).
 Major investment banks built on swaps and other derivatives went illiquid and took down all liquidity.
 Major endowments holding ―alternatives‖ were illiquid and unable to liquidate.
All financial markets froze both in the US and across the globe.


The ―BIG‖ endowments … tanked – in weeks!

Institution FY1990 FY2008 Increase FY2009 Decline
Value Value Value
Harvard $4.6 Billion $36.5 Billion 790% $25.6 Billion -29.8%

Yale $2.6 Billion $22.8 Billion 870% $16.3 Billion -28.6%

Stanford $2.5 Billion $17.2 Billion 688% $12.6 Billion -26.7%

Princeton $2.5 Billion $16.3 Billion 652% $12.6 Billion -22.8%

University of Texas $3.7 Billion $16.1 Billion 435% $12.1 Billion -24.8%

MIT $1.4 Billion $10.1 Billion 721% $7.9 Billion -20.7%

University of $0.4 Billion $7.3 Billion 1,825% $6.0 Billion -20.7%
Michigan
Columbia $1.4 Billion $7.3 Billion 521% $5.8 Billion -19.8%

Northwestern $0.9 Billion $7.2 Billion 800% $5.4 Billion -24.8%

University of Penn $0.8 Billion $6.2 Billion 775% $5.1 Billion -16.8%


The endowment disasters were exacerbated
by illiquidity; the need to sell into the bear…

 Suddenly there was no cash…
- Endowments were holding almost no cash to begin with.
- Many were leveraged and investing on margins that others were calling.
 More than half of assets (51%) were held in ―non-traditional‖ assets:
- Hedge funds, Real Estate Trusts, Futures Contracts, etc.
 Cash is only available by selling traditional assets–
at the worst possible time into horrible markets.
- The tendency was to sell the assets that were most worthy of retention
because they were the only ones for which there was a market.
- The best markets were in assets least affected and most likely to appreciate in
the up-turn.
 Hence, the losses were worse than they might have been and the
prognosis for recovery was also worse than it might have been…


The FY2009 was really more than a market
collapse, it became a huge cash-flow problem.


New York Times 1/27/09 Headline:


Wall Street Journal 1/27/09
Headline: ―College Endowments Plunge‖

NACUBO FY09 Report
listed that in top 100
endowments:
 19 reported losses of more
than 25%.
 52 reported losses between
20% and 25%.
 Only 28 reported losses of
less than 20%
 Only 1 report a single
digit loss.
 The average loss was
22.5% for the fiscal year.


Lately, the big endowments have gone from
being victims to being co-conspirators…


The Perfect Storm: public scrutiny of college
endowments gains strength…

Attention to endowment
declines exacerbated
another old issue:
 Why do colleges have
these big ―savings
accounts?‖
 Higher Ed inflation is
nearly double general
inflation.
 The middle class
squeeze is reflected in
the FAFSA rules.
 Is intergenerational
equity really equitable?


Where do we go from here?


Campaigns are coming back…
and, they‘re focusing on endowment.

What do the campaigns under
way or under consideration at
your institutions look like?


Point one:
Philanthropy is extraordinarily resilient!
Giving was thought
to have dropped by
Corrected from 5.7% decline 5.7% in 2008; the
to a 1.5% increase. second decline in
50 years (since
1960).
$ in billions
Final report for
2009 just out
Showed that giving
was NOT down in
2008 as expected.
Instead it was UP
1.5%

But it showed that
2009 giving was off
by 3.2%.

Giving USA 2010

Campaigns are (almost) all about major gifts.

Bottom 90% Wealthiest 1%
 Wealth (and
Ownership of 23.1% 33.5%
Publicly Traded income) in America
Stock.
Data from: Edward N. Wolff
Next 9% are distributed very
43.4%
New York University 2004
unevenly.
GOAL: $300,000,000

Prospects # Gifts Size Totals Cumulative

3
6
1
2
$
$
50,000,000
25,000,000
$ 50,000,000
$ 50,000,000
$
$
50,000,000
100,000,000
 Campaign giving
21

24
7

8
$

$
10,000,000

5,000,000
$ 70,000,000

$ 40,000,000
$

$
170,000,000

210,000,000
must also be
48
60
16
20
$
$
2,000,000
1,000,000
$ 32,000,000
$ 20,000,000
$
$
242,000,000
262,000,000 spread unevenly –
90 30 $ 500,000 $ 15,000,000 $ 277,000,000
120
180
40
60
$
$
250,000
100,000
$ 10,000,000
$ 6,000,000
$
$
287,000,000
293,000,000
more unevenly
210
270
375
70
90
125
$
$
$
50,000
25,000
10,000
$
$
$
3,500,000
2,250,000
1,250,000
$
$
$
296,500,000
298,750,000
300,000,000
than in the past.
1407 469 $ 300,000,000


The real campaigning questions are about our
wealthy Alumni.

 In 1982 Dan Ludwig topped the Forbes
400 list at $2 billion.
- There were 13 American billionaires
 In 2006 all Forbes 400 were
billionaires.
 In 2006 there were 11 million
millionaires in the US.
- 10% had inherited fortunes
- 10% ―earned‖ it in films, etc.

- 80% ―built‖ it in business.
 In 2004 the richest 1% earned $1.35
trillion in income. (What ASSETS are
needed to earn that much?)
 The relevant issues in our campaigns
are about entrepreneurs.


Entrepreneurs and Endowments

1. ―You folks simply don‘t know how to make money
work. I can make a much better return on the capital if I
keep it in my portfolio.‖

2. ―Endowment is to an institution what tenure is to a
professor—license not to work.‖

3. ―The stability you talk about is just insulation from the
real world. It disconnects you from the market.
—it‘s not healthy—it‘s like inherited wealth.‖


The traditional case for endowment had
evolved slowly…

Endowment legends of yesteryear:
 Endowments came from bequests.

 Endowments were largely sourced from real estate.

 Only the very wealthy ―gambled‖ with publicly
traded stock.
 Acceptable investments were treasury bills and
real estate.
 Endowment gifts frequently came with more investment
restrictions than spending restrictions.


The traditional case for endowment had
evolved slowly…the legends.

Endowments were the essence of “stability.”
 They grew slowly, if at all. Income rarely fluctuated.
- (Little preoccupation with inflation. Perpetuity was a very complex thought.)

 Asset value was not necessarily a factor in income.
- (Fixed income vehicles – principally Government Bonds – were very common.)

 In the ‗50s the Ford Foundation and others began making
endowment grants as encouragement.
 But, the ‗60s and the baby boom pushed colleges back
into bricks and mortar expansion.
 In the ‗80s Foundations redoubled by funding planned
giving consulting through grants…

The last two decades changed
endowment fundraising (we hit the easy button):
 The new perpetual bull markets began to compete with
the kind of growth that the entrepreneur could produce –
they took us more seriously.
 We became much more savvy in our own market-speak.
 Our management practices adapted to the new realities.
 Our accounting policies began count differently making
―deferred‖ gifts more palatable to those wishing to
leverage their giving.
 Endowments really did look like the ―game changer‖ we
talked about it our campaign marketing.


The case for endowment must evolve:

 We can no longer inspire prospects with the idea that our endowment
should be as large as the competition‘s—the rankings discussion has
largely gone mute.
 We can no longer rely on simply telling prospects that endowment is
key to ―stability.‖
 The new pressure for increased spending from endowment conjures
the old misunderstanding that its simply a ―savings account.‖
 We must push the discussion back from dollars to real values
– it‘s not about the endowment, but what the endowment will fund…

Endowments, like campaigns, are not about what the community can do
for the institution, but about what the institution does for the community.


Building the case will require us to
be better informed.
1. We have to understand our policies and practices to speak
coherently. How have your policies changed?
- Who sets the policies about investment strategy? What are they?
- Who sets the policies about payout? What are they?
2. We need to be conversant with our own recent endowment history.
What happened at your institution?
- How did your endowment fare in the recent market?
- What happened to the programs that were depending on endowments?
- What messages did you carry to the donors who had a stake in your funds?
3. We must formulate tight talking points about:
- The fiscal conservatism that is appropriate to our fiduciary responsibility.
- Intergenerational equity – an aspect of perpetuity (forever, but also now).
- We need a new conversation about the role of endowment at our institutions?


Idiosyncrasies and conundrums:

 Endowments frequently look more like budget relief than
strategic ventures – because of how we use them.
 Endowed chairs, about ―attracting and retaining,‖ have
frequently been disconnected from strategy.
 We‘ve used them to reward existing faculty and real outcomes are no
where to be seen.

 Endowed scholarships are, unfortunately, ―scalable.‖
 What is the right number for a scholarship?
 ―Scholarships‖ now often raise the bigger issue: cost containment.
 Is your new scholarship really ―new,‖ or does it simply fund the discount?
Help your prospect think about how the fund ripples through the institution.


Jaa -endowment fundraising july 2010 (jpd1542)

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